Appraisal of a second railway project by The World Bank(Projects Department)
RESTRICTED
Report No. TO- 598a
This report was prepared for use within the Bank and its affiliated organizations.
They do not accept responsibility for its accuracy or completeness. The report may
not be published nor may it be quoted as representing their views.
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
APPRAISAL OF
A SECOND RAILWAY PROJECT
KOREA
November 21, 1967
Projects Department
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
US$ 1 = Won 265
Won 1 = US$ 0. 0038
Won 1, 000, 000 = US$ 3, 773
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES EQUIVALENTS
I m= 3.Z8 ft
1 km 0. 62 mi
1 km = 0.386 sq mi
1 kg = 2.205 lb
rn ton 2,205 lb
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A SECOND RAILROAD PROJECT
Table of Contents
Page
SUO ARY i - ii
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. BACKGROUND 2
Geography and Population 2
The Korean Economy 2
Transportation Sector 2
Transport Coordination 3
3. THE KOREAN NATIONAL RAILROAD 4
Organization, Management and Staff 4
Railroad Property 5
Operations 8
Freight Traffic 8
Passenger Traffic 9
Present Finances 9
4. THE PROJECT 13
The 1967-1971 Development Program 13
Description of the Project 15
Financing of the Project 17
Execution of the Project 17
5. FUIURE EARNINGS AND FINANCES 16
Tariffs lv
Forecast Operating Results 18
Forecast Cash Flow 19
Forecast Balance Sheets 21
6. ECONO1MIC JUSTIFICATION 21
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24
This Appraisal Report is based on the findings of an appraisal mission
in April, 1967, consisting of Messrs. MacKay, Chapman and Parthasarathi.
Messrs. Brandreth and De Gryse contributed to the preparation of the report.
Table of Contents (Continued) - Page 2 -
Tables
1. Freight Transport by Mode
2. Passenger Transport by Mode
3. Composition of Motive Power and Rolling Stock as at December 31,
1966 through 1971
4. Summary of Operating Statistics
5. BEK Freight Traffic
6. Analysis of Commercial Freight Traff.ic, 1955-1966
7. Summary Income Accounts, 1962-1966
8. Summary Balance Sheets as of December 31, 1965 and 1966
9. Composition of Debt as of December 31, 1966
10. The Development Program, 1967-1971
11. New Line Construction, 1967-1971
12. Forecast Income Accounts, 1967-1971
13. Forecast Cash Flow Statement, 1967-1971
14. Pro-forma Balance Sheets as of December 31, 1967-1971
15. Traffic Forecasts for Principal Commodities, 1967-1971
Annex - Employment of Consultants by ITR
Map - Korean National Railroad (IBRD 2071)
KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A SECOND RAILROAD PROJECT
SUMMARY
is The Government of the Republic of Korea has asked the Association
for a credit of US$ 11 million equivalent o help finance the first three
years of the Korean National Railroad (INR) Development Program which is
part of the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan, 1967-1971, of Korea.
KNR's investments during the period 1967-1969 are estimated at 42.5 billion
Won (US$ 160 million equivalent) with a foreign exchange component of
US$ 64 million equivalent.
ii. In 1962 the Republic of Korea received an IDA credit (No. 25-KO)
of US$ 14 million equivalent to finance purchases and services under KNR's
Development Program, 1962-1966. The project has been completed satisfac-
torily.
iii. In 1965 the Bank financed the foreign exchange cost (US$ 388,000)
of a detailed, integrated transportation survey for the entire country
and all modes of transport. This survey was completed in 1966. WNR's
Development Program, 1967-1971, is based largely on recommendations made
by the transportation survey.
iv. The Project would consist of the first three years of the Pro-
gram and the proposed credit would finance the foreign exchange component
of priority requirements in this period. These requirements are hopper
cars for coal, which constitutes KNR's principal freight traffic; tank
cars for oil, which is a rapidly increasing traffic; and consulting ser-
vices. The coal and oil cars are being procured under international
competitive bidding in accordance with the Association's requirements.
v. The management of KNR is generally satisfactory, but provision
is made in the Project to correct some organizational and staff deficiencies.
The maintenance of property is also generally satisfactory except for
older rolling stock for which recommendations are made. Operational
efficiency is improving and is acceptable. For the last ten years freight
and passenger traffic has been increasing sharply; further increases are
expected during the period 1967-1971 at 11% for freight and 8% for
passengers per annum.
vi. Because of the overall low level of tariffs, the rate of return
has, so far, been inadequate. Measures to strengthen the financial
situation of KNR are included in the Project and are expected to result
in the achievement of a satisfactory rate of return.
vii. The Project is justified on economic grounds. It would ensure
the continued and expanded operation of KNR which, as the principal
transport mode, is essential to the economic needs of the country.
The IDA-financed part of the Project would yield an economic return of
20%; the other project items are also expected to achieve satisfactory
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returns although it has not been possible to quantify all of them indi-
vidually.
viii. The Project is suitable for an IA, credit of US$ 11 million
equivalent o the Government of the Republic of Korea, to be made available
to 1qiR at 6% rate of interest for a term of 25 years, including a three-
year period of grace.
KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A SECOND RAIIROAD PROJECT
1. 1 4TRODUCTION
1.1 The Government of the Republic of Korea has asked the Association
for a credit of US$ 11 million equivalent o help finance part of the fo-
reign exchange cost of the Korean National Railroad's (KNR) Development
Program, which is part of the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan,
1967-1971, of Korea. The KNR Program is to modernize and expand capacity,
mainly by: the construction of new lines and the relaying of old lines
in heavier track material; the building of marshalling and reception
yards and the provision of improved signalling; the equipping of workshops;
the procuring of additional more powerful locomotives; and the procuring
and manufacturing of additional higher capacity rolling stock. The cost
of the Five-Year Program is estimated at 57 billion Won (US$ 215 million
equivalent),of which, 39 billion Won (US$ 147 million) is in local currency
and 18 billion W/Jon (US$ 68 million) in foreign exchange. The Project would
comprise the first three years of the Program, from 1967 to 1969. The
credit would finance the purchase of 600 hopper cars for coal, 450 tank
cars for oil and the employment of consultants; all of these are priority
requirements within the Project.
1.2 This report is based on the findings of an IDA, mission, consisting
of Messrs. Mackay, Chapman and Parthasarathi, which visited Korea in April,
1967, and on information provided by KNR and the Government of Korea.
Messrs. Brandreth and De Gryse of the Association also contributed to the
preparation of the report.
1.3 In 1962 IDA lent $14 million (Credit 25-KO) to the Government
of Korea to finance KNR purchases of passenger cars and coal cars and to
engage consultants to establish a sound accounting and statistical system;
disbursements were completed by December 31, 1965. These purchases and
services were part of KNR's First Five-Year Development Program, 1962-
1966, which was originally estimated to cost 17.15 billion Won. The Program
was revised in 1964 to 35.7 billion Won, to allow for faster increases
in traffic and prices than had been estimated. The passenger cars and coal
cars are all in service, are technically satisfactory and are being well-
maintained. There is a problem of appropriate unloading facilities for
the coal cars which is currently receiving attention. A modern accounting
system has been installed and is working satisfactorily. The production
of statistics is copious but still requires improvement (see Annex).
The Development Program, 1962-1966, as revised, was 80%, completed by the
end of 1966.
1.4 In 1965, the Government of Korea appointed consultants (BCEOM/
SOFRERAIL, French, cooperating with NEDECO, Dutch) to carry out an
integrated transportation survey for the entire country and all modes of
transport. The foreign exchange cost of this survey of US$ 388,000
equivalent was financed under IBRD technical assistance.l/ The survey was
completed in 1966. It provided data and made recommendations which,
inter alia, were useful to KNR and to the Government in drawing up KWRs
Development Program 1967-1971.
1/ Presidenbts Letter R65-147 of Sept. 13, 1965.
2. BACKGROUND
Geography and Population
2.1 The Republic of Korea constitutes the southern half of the
Korean peeinsula below the 38th parallel of latitude. With an area of
98,430 km it is about the size of Portugal.
2.2 The population in 1966 was about 29 million, representing a
density of 295 persons per km2 , higher than that of Japan (262) but less
than that of Taiwan (336). In the recent past the population growth has
come down somewhat from the previous high rate of about 2.9% a year. Over
10 of the country's population is concentrated in the capital city of
Seoul.
The Korean Economy
2.3 Agriculture constitutes the most important sector, contributing
about 35% of the GNP and providing the livelihood of about 58% of the
population. Mining arni manufacturing account for 21% of GNP (11% of
population). Per capita GNP in 1966 was about US$ 125 equivalent, about
one-eighth of the level of Japan.
2.4 During the past ten years, the output of the economy grew 7% a
year on the average, accelerating during the First Five-Year Plan (1962-66)
to an annual rate of about 8.5%. The Government has launched a Second Five-
Year Plan (1967-71) with a target of a 7% annual growth; a Bank economic
mission last year considered this growth rate attainable (see Report No.
AS-116 - Appraisal of Korean's Second Five-Year Plan). Since then, the
economy has recorded a growth of 12% during 1966, and a growth rate of
8% in the next four years is now considered quite feasible and has been
accepted for railroad planning by the Association in agreement with the
Government.
Transportation Sector
2.5 At present, inland transport requirements in Korea are concen-
trated in a triangle formed by Seoul in the northwest, the coal-mining
areas in the northeast and Pu San, the country's largest port in the
southeast. These three areas are connected by the Korean National Railroad.
Road transport of freight and passengers is confined mostly to short-
distance local and feeder traffic.
2.6 Tables 1 and 2 show the movement of both freight and passengers
over all transportation modes in Korea since 1955. These indicate a
quadrupling of freight handled (equal to a growth of 15% a year) and a
tripling of passengers handled (11.5% a year). In spite of a rapid growth
in traffic moving by road, the railroad continues its predominance, with
54% of the tonnage of freight, 82% of ton-km, 39% of passengers handled
and 65% of pass-km.
2.7 At the end of 1965, Korea had about 28,100 km of highways, of
which only a very small proportion, some 1,500 km, were paved. This
compared with a total length of about 26,600 km in 1955, of which only
640 km were paved, and reflects very slow progress in the improvement of
the highway network. There were about 42,000 motor vehicles in Korea at
the end of 1965 compared with 18,000 in 1956, a growth of 9% a year.
The present fleet represents one vehicle for every 700 persons, one of the
lawest ratios of the world. Since 1957, highway vehicles have carried
more passengers than the railroad, but in terms of pass-km the railroad
is predominant since long-distance passengers prefer to travel by train
because of the poor condition of the road network. In freight movements,
the railroad carries more tonnage and about eight times as many ton-km
as the highways.
2.8 Coastal shipping is relatively unimportant for passenger move-
ment, but accounts for about 6% of all freight handled, mainly coal, oil,
ores and lumber.
2.9 Korea has a number of airports, of which eight are open to
civilian traffic. Passenger movement by air has been growing rapidly
but still accounts for less than 0.1% of persons handled by all modes.
Freiglht ransport by air is negligible.
Transport Coordination
2.10 Transport coordination problems in Korea have been minimal
because of the overall shortage of transport and the fact that development
of each mode has, so far, been geared to specific transport requirements.
The aspect of coordination which is normally the most critical, road-rail
competition, has not reached serious proportions as yet since the poor
quality of the roads limits road services to short-haul movements with
small capacity vehicles. At the same time, there have been restrictions
on vehicle purchases arising from foreign currency limitations. The
Second Five-Year Plan for road development provides for the proportion of
paved to total road mileage to increase from about 6% in 1966 to 16% in
1971, with only limited new mileage. In these circumstances no drastic
change is to be expected in road-rail competition in the near future.
2.11 However, certain problems in coordination,are beginning to
appear. Where new areas of development are planned, a choice between
transport modes must be made. Planned port improvements will benefit
coastal shipping, making it more competitive with the railroad for long-
distance bulk transport. The problems of user charges and taxation
policies have been highlighted by the Bank-financed transportation survey
(para. 1.4) which has pointed out that road users are paying much more
than the cost of thc services they receive. To this degree, road transport
is penalized in comparison to the railroad, airlines and coastal shipping.
The Government is aware of these problems and has recently requested Bank
assistance for a study which, while primarily concerned with a review of
highway organization and administration problems arising from the recent
transportation survey, would also provide for detailed consideration of
the administrative and legislative provisions required to implement a
program of transport coordination. This request is currently receiving
Bank consideration.
- h -
3. THE KOREAN NATIONAL RAILROAD
Organization, Wianagement and Staff
3.1 Until 1963 INR was an integral part of the IMinistry of Trans-
portation; it had no separate legal status or independent management.
A requirement of the 1962 Credit Agreement was that the Borrower should
establish and maintain the Railroad as a separate entity with an appro-
priate organization and powers. In 1963, under the Government Organiza-
tion Law, an independent railway manager was appointed and KNR was
established as a separate entity with its own budget and accounting.
The revised organization of the Railroad is an improvement, but there is
still an excessive degree of dependence on Government, in staff, financial
and budgetary matters. The Government is aware of this position and has
set up a committee to reorganize KNR as a public corporation or other
autonomous entity by the end of 1969. It was agreed during negotiations
that the action initiated by the Korean Government was desirable and that,
whatever the eventual organizational solution, KNR should in the meantime
be given more authority and flexibility of operation in certain defined
areas which are referred to in paras. 3.5, 3.37 and 5.5.
3.2 A weakness in KNR management is the lack of senior qualified
engineering, economic and accounting staff. The shortage of professionally
qualified officers, which KNR should now alleviate by increased recruitment
from the universities, and the size and complexity of KMR's Development
Program, mean that consultants must be used extensively throughout the
five-year period to make technical and economic studies before major
investment decisions are made. A list of problems which should be studied
and on which consultants should be employed is given in the Annex. It was
confirmed during negotiations that suitable consultants will be appointed
for these purposes.
3.3 The employment of qualified staff has been adversely affected
by the substantially higher salaries paid by industrial and commercial
enterprises. The wage level of lower grade staff has also been low.
To correct this position KNR has embarked, at Government direction and
in common with other Government enterprises, on a policy of doubling all
wages and salaries in the three-year period 1966-1968. Increases of 30% 1/
were awarded as from January 1, 1966, and further increases of 30% 1/
were awarded as from April 1, 1967. These increases in expenditure have
not yet been offset by any increases in rates and fares, a matter referred
to later (paras. 3.26 and 5.1).
3.4 Even with the doubling of wages and salaries between 1965 and 1968
the ratio of staff costs to total costs (36%) is low in relation to other
railwiays. However, although the necessity to increase wages and salaries
is recognized, such quick escalation reduces the margin for later adjust-
ments and the possibility of spreading the remaining increases of 40% 1/
due in 1968 over a longer period was discussed during negotiations.
The Association was advised that commitments already made would allow of
no change.
1/ Based on 1965 salary levels.
3.5 The number of permanent employees at the end of 1966 was 29,976,
an increase of 3,660 or 14% since 1961. In the same period, traffic units,
as measured in terms of pass-km and net ton-km of freight, increased by
59% and productivity per employee increased by 40%. The number of
employees per 1,000 train-km is 0.93, which is the same as the Taiwan
Railway, slightly higher than the Japanese Railways (0.75) and much better
than most railways. There is scope, however, for further improvement
through modernization and increasing mechanization. In addition to
permanent staff, KNR is currently employing 5,450 temporary staff, of whom
3,410 are used in the workshops, largely for the construction of new
passenger and freight cars and the rebuilding of old cars. KNR has been
instructed by Government o give as many temporary staff as possible
permanent status. It 'las a-reed in negotiltioxls that ICTR would not give
permanent c.lo ,ent unless t.aere was permanent- need and that, generally,
KNRwould contain the number of staff at levels consistent with maintaining
or improving the existing levels of productivity.
3.6 In general, KNR staff display excellent discipline and indus-
triousness. Relations with labor are satisfactory.
Railroad Property
(i) Railway Lines
3.7 KNR's network is relatively extensive. At the end of 1966 KNR
operated 3,435 route-km of standard gauge (1.435 m) lines, and 126 km of
narrow gauge (0.)15 in) lines. The mainlines from Seoul to Pu San (443 km)
and from Seoul to In Cheon (30 km) are double track; all other lines are
single track. There are many sections in mountaineous areas: over 40%
of the network has grades over 1%, there are long sections of 2.5% and some
of 3%f; there are numerous curves and 110 km of tunnels and 81 km of
bridges.
3.8 The total length of track, including double track and sidings, is
5,049 km. 1,374 kam is laid in 50 kg/m rails, 2,600 km in 37 kg/m rails
and the rest in lighter rails. 17% of all rails are under 10 years old
and 20% more than 30 years. All renewal of principal ines is now with
50 kg/m rails. With the growth of traffic and use of heavier diesel
locomotives, further relaying is necessary and planned. Experiments are
in process with long welded rails. Ties are mostly of imported hardwood,
but since 1962 KNR has used concrete ties, manufactured in Korea, for
renewal purposes and some 850 km of track are so equipped. Ballast is
generally adequate. Considerable attention is paid to track maintenance
and the condition of the track is good. The strengthening of some bridges
is necessary and planned.
3.9 Signalling arrangements consist of color lights in the Seoul area
and electric block instruments on main lines. Centralized traffic control
(CTC) is being installed on the single line of heaviest traffic between
Seoul and Bong Yang. Increasing traffic is creating capacity problems on
other lines which will require signalling improvements. The communication
system is satisfactory.
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(ii) Motive Power and Rolling Stock
3.10 KNRts motive power and rolling stock position as at the end o£
1966 is shouJn in Table 3. A summary is given below:
Motive Power Nuaber of Units
Steam 2h2
Diesel shunting 13
Diesel mainline 160
Diesel railcars 163
Passenger Car Stock 1,h49
Freight Car Stock 11,039
3.11 In January, 1967, KNR received 17 additional mainline diesel
locomotives and in the latter half of this year will receive 62 more,
financed by USAID; these locomotives are from the 1962-1966 Program.
With the acquisition of these diesels the remaining steam locomotives
are to be phased out of service. The condition of the steam locomotives
is poor and with impending replacement their maintenance is confined
to the minimum. The condition of the diesel locomotives is good and
they are well maintained. Excellent availability of about 97% has been
sustained over the last fevw years. However, many of the diesel locomo-
tives are now reaching the age when major overhauls are due and specific
parts should be replaced. KNR has not been making adequate financial
provision for the purchase of spare parts for diesel locomotives or for
rolling stock generally and recommendations to deal with this problem are
made in Section 4. At present the most powerful diesel locomotives are
1800 hp. W'ith the progressive extension of heavier track and the strength-
ening of bridges (para. 3.8) new locomotives will be in the 2000 hp to
2400 hp range which will allow for increased train loads and/or speeds.
3.12 The diesel railcars are well maintained with availability of
86%; 88 of the railcars, or more than half the fleet, is less than two
years old. Tlhe cars are of 360 hp but are mostly operated with two
trailers and so have a low power-to-weight ratio. KIR agree with the
transportation consultants' recommendation that further purchases of
railcars should have increased unit power to permit better train schedules.
3.13 About 43% of all passenger cars are 25 years old or more, but
47% are less than 6 years old. The accommodation is comfortable. Largely
because of the high percentage of older cars, which received intense usage
during two wars, the availability of passenger stock (89%) is lower than
desirable. The older stock is also unduly heavy and KNR plan replacement
with lighter stock under the new Program to give better availability and
operating performance.
3.14 Some 440% of the freight car stock is 25 years old or more.
Present maximum capacity per car is 40 tons but average capacity is about
35 tons. The need for new cars of improved design and higher capacity is
dealt with in Section 4. Availability of existing cars at 87% is low.
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Two main factors preventing better performance are the poor design of
axle boxes and the generally inadequate facilities provided for inspection
and maintenance, including shortage of spares. The number of hot boxes is
excessive. It was agreed in negotiations that to the extent practicable
there should be renewal of axle boxes on existing cars, preferably with
roller bearings, and that improved maintenance facilities, including
better stocks of spares would be provided. The use of consultants to
help KNR in these matters was also agreed.
(iii) Other Property
3.15 1OR's marshalling yard facilities are generally inadequate in
relation to rapidly expanding traffic and the need to increase consolidated
train load operations. So far, three major enlargements of general purpose
yards are in hand - at Je Cheon (mainly for coal traffic) at Ga Ya (for
Pu San) and at Su Saeg (for Seoul). More yards are planned and needed.
Special yard facilities for the reception of coal traffic, particularly
in the Seoul area, are also inadequate and coal hopper cars, designed for
mechanical discharge, have to be offloaded mostly by hand. As a result,
the turn-round of these special cars, which could be 2.5 days, is 4.5 days.
To correct this deficiency, KNR has been building a specially designed
reception yard at Rimoondong (for Seoul). The Government and the coal
industry, however, are now having second thoughts about the whole complex
problem of the reception, storage, manufacture (into briquettes) and
distribution of coal in the Seoul area. The tonnages involved, seasonally
peaked in winter, are some 4 million tons at present, rising to 6 million
tons by 1971. It may be that two more yards wqill be built thereby altering
the scale and functioning of Rimoondong. The Government now recognizes
that the coal and briquette traffic in the Seoul area poses major problems;
however, railroad operations are only one aspect of these problems and
cannot be dealt with in isolation. It was agreed during negotiations
that KNR, with the full support of the Government, would employ consultants
to study and advise on this problem and that the Government would use its
best efforts to obtain agreement among all parties concerned, including the
coal industry and the City of Seoul, on the implementation and financing
of the courses of action indicated to be appropriate by the study. It was
further agreed during negotiations that the appointment of consultants for
this purpose, satisfactory to the Association, was a matter of priority,
and it has been made a condition of effectiveness of the proposed credit.
It was further agreed that consultants would be employed by KNR to make
a comprehensive review of the location, design and operation of all yards
generally generally before further major expenditure was committed.
3.16 KNR has four main workshops, two in Seoul (at Yeong Deung Po
and Yong San) and one each in Pu San and In Cheon. The Yeong Deung Po
workshop, which is used largely for steam locomotives, is to be closed
after dieselization is completed. The remaining three workshops should
be adequate for all requiremnents, but much of the machiniery is obsolete
and worn out and is planned to be replaced.
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3.17 Nany KMR buildings, such as offices, stations and sheds, are
old and too small for growirg traffic requirements. However, they are
well maintained and replacement and improvement cannot be accorded high
priority in view of other urgent needs.
Operations
3.18 Table 4 gives a summary of operating statistics from 1961 to
1966. It shows that rapidly increasing traffic has been accompanied by
improved operating efficiency. Traffic units per locomotive and per
employee have risen progressively and pass-km per passenger car and net
ton-km per freight car have also improved. Performance in these respects
is good, but there are signs that under present conditions the limits of
operating efficiency are being, or have been, reached: the average turn-
round time of freight cars is static at 4.5 days; diesel locomotive avail-
ability, which is being held around 97% is excellent and cannot be improved;
freight cars carry close to their effective capacity; and passenger cars
frequently have occupancy of over 100%.
3.19 These figures indicate that increases in traffic must largely
entail further investment to expand capacity. There is, however, also
scope for better utilization of existing assets. Thus, improved
maintenance of rolling stock (para. 3.14) and the proper handling of coal
traffic (para. 3.15) should allow for a progressive reduction in car turn-
round figures. Oil tank cars have a poor turn-round of 6.5 days. This
is largely because of: a) slow discharge of military oil, b) the need to
defreeze fuel oil in winter, and c) inadequate storage. The new tank cars
proposed will allow defreezing en route. During negotitions it was agreed
that Goverrnment would examine the provision of adequate storage by the
oil industry and that IKR would apply increased demurrage charges on tank
wiagons as a deterrent to slow discharge.
Freight Traffic
3.20 Between 1955 and 1966 EIR's total freight traffic grewq about 8%
per year in tonnage and 9.5% in ton-km. This is almost entirely due to
commercial traffic (as distinct from military and railway service freight)
which grew 13.5% in volume and 14.5% in ton-km during the period. As a
result, commercial freight now accounts for 87% of all ton-km,, as against
only 51% in 1955 (see Tables 5 and 6). Commercial traffic growth has
slowed slightly in the past five years, but the rate has remained above
12% per year, which is still impressive.
3.21 Coal traffic increased from 1.3 rmillion tons in 1955 to about
10 million tons in 1966 (over 20% per year) and now accounts for 40% of
total freight tonnage. Cement traffic has increased at an even faster
rate, in excess of 30% annually, to reach 1.7 million tons in 1966 (7%
of total tonnage) while fertilizer, with an equal tonnage, has registered
a growth rate of over 8% annually. With oil, grain, ore and timber
movements making up another 14% of the traffic, bulk traffic constituted
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70$ of the total volume moved in 1966 and 83% of the conmercial tonnage.
In terms of ton-kmn, the basic bulk commodities of coal, cement, grain,
oil and fertilizer constituted 57% of total traffic and 65% of commercial
movements.
3.22 The average freight transport distance is 220 kmi, and has
remained at about this level over the last several years. Although there
are seasonal traffic peaks, for example, coal, the inadequacy of IOR
capacity to meet all demands results in there being only small traffic
fluctuations.
Passenger Traffic
3.23 Passenger traffic throughout the period 1955 to 1966 increased
about 8% a year in both numbers and pass-km. Following an increase of 35%
in passenger fares on January 1, 1965, passenger traffic declined during
the year by about 6%, but has since recovered and resumed the normal growth
pattern. The earlier passenger fare increase of 15% in 1964, however, had
no adverse impact on the growth of passenger traffic.
3.24 Commuter traffic is relatively important although it is uncon-
centrated on the Seoul-In Cheon line. About one-f.ifth of the passengers
and one-tenth of pass-km are accounted for by this traffic. Altogether,
passengers travelling by third-class constitute 97% of the total, upper
class passengers about 1.5% and military personnel the balance of 1.5%.
The average distance travelled is about 62 km., 21 km in the case of
commuters and 77 km for other passengers, and has not changed much in the
last ten years.
Present Finances
Tariffs
3.25 Like all Government enterprises, KNR must have its tariffs
reviewed by a rate-making committee before they are approved by the
Government. The committee consists of the Deputy Prime MLnister, who is
Chairman, assisted by four ministers and ten other qualified individuals.
3.26 Tariffs are generally low and increases made during recent years
have not fully offset increases in costs, arising mainly from devaluation
and increases -in wages and salaries. Under Credit 25-XO of August 17, 1962,
agreement was reached to increase, on or before June 1, 1963, KNR s freight
revenue by 25%; the increase was not granted but was replaced - with the
concurrence of the Association - by an overall increase of 15% in both
freight rates and passenger fares, effective January 1, 1964. Resultant
additional revenue more than equalled that expected from the originally
agreed 25% increase in freight rates only, but the seven months delay in
applying the increase affected KiRts earnings. Rises in costs in 1965 were
met by an increase of 15% in rates and of 35% in fares effective January 1,
1965, but further substantial increases in costs since then have not yet
been offset by any tariff increases.
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3.27 The freight rate structure is relatively simple with tlhree
classes for carload traffic (which accounts for over 90% of all freight)
and three for less-tlan-carload traffic. In 1966, the average receipt per
ton-km was only Won 1.11, lower than most railways in the world (equivalent
to about US 0.67 cents per ton/mile), as compared with the average cost,
including depreciation, of Won 1.26, as calculated by KMR. A request for
a 20% increase in carload rates, to be effective July 1, 1966, was not
approved by the Government. Proposals to improve the situation, agreed
upon during negotiations, are described in the Section on "Future Earnings
and Finances".
3.28 There are three classes of passenger fares, averaging lWon 3.20,
1.62 and 0.81 per km. Substantial reductions, imposed by the Government,
are granted to teachers and students (30%), arned forces and police (50%),
and to student commuters (70%). The average receipt per pass-km in 1966
was only WSon 0.97, lower than on most railways in the world (US 0.59 cents
per passenger/mile), as compared with the average cost, including deprecia-
tion, of Won 0.93. This does not allow KNR to achieve a reasonable return
on passenger traffic and measures to correct the situation are also
described in the Section on "Future Earnings and Finances".
3.29 Independent of the tariff increases required to achieve a
reasonable return on the investment, there is a need for the complete
revision of Ki'R's tariff structure with a view to assess tariffs of
individual traffics on relation to cost. KNR has embarked upon such a
review but progress has been slow, due largely to the lack of qualified
staff. A recent USAID loan makes provision for the appointment of experts
to assist in this matter and the possibility of a study by the cost
section of the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission, on terms of reference
prepared by the Association, is being pursued currently.
Operating Results
3.30 The income accounts for the years 1962-1966 are given in Table 7.
Except for 1966, actual operating results compare favorably with the
forecast prepared for the appraisal of Credit 25-KO. Summary figures are
given below.
Won Billion
1962 1963 196h 1965 1966
Operating Revenue 7.1 8.4 l0.4 13.1 15.7
Working Expenses 4.8 5.6 7.7 9.6 13.3
Depreciation 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.6
Operating Expenses ___ 7T TT. lh.9
Net Operating Revenue 0.3 0.9 0W. 1. 0.8
Other Income (Loss) 0.1 (0.5) 0.6 0.2 0.3
Interest Charges - 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4
Net Income 0.7 0.3 0.8 1.4 0.7
Operating Ratio 96 90 94 89 95
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The fluctuations of the operating ratio reflect the timing of the tariff
adjustments a-reed to by the Government. Interest and debt coverage
ratios were adequate over the period. The depreciation allowance for 1966
was about 10% of gross operating revenue and 3.6% of average gross depre-
ciable fixed assets, which is reasonable; the revaluation of fixed assets
presently underway (see para 3.33) will result in increased epreciation
charges in the future.
3.31 Due to the abselnce of a record of properly identified and valued
fixed assets, it has not been possible to measure KNR's rate of return
before 1965. Rates of 2.5% and 1.5% were achieved in 1965 and 1966,
respectively; they are inadequate and the proposals made later in this
report aim to increase substantially the return on KNR's investment.
Financial Position
3.32 KHR's balance sheet as of December 31, 1965 and 1966 is shown
in Table 8, and summarized below.
IWon Billion
1965 1966
ASSETS
Net fixed assets (including work in progress) 70.1 79.5
Current assets 5.2 7.0
Other assets 2.8 2.7
Total Assets 78.1 89,2
LMIBILITIES
Current liabilities 2.5 4.9
Allowance for modernization - 0.6
Long-term debt 5.2 11.9
Equity (including retained earnings) 70.4 71.8
Total Liabilities 78.1 89.2
3.33 As indicated in para.3.31, the physical identification and
valuation of KNR's fixed assets was not completed before 1965 and the
first realistic view of INR's finances was given in its balance sheet
as of December 31, 1965. Gross fixed assets existing at December 31,
1962 were revalued at prices ruling at that date; those acquired
subsequently were added at actual cost. In 1964L, the Won was devalued
by about 100'6; the impact of this measure is to be taken into account
in the revaluation of fixed assets as of December 31, 1966, which is
presently underway. The procedures used in the revaluation, and the
results thereof, will be checked by external auditors being appointed
under the USAID loan already referred to in para. 3.29, whose report will
be made available to the Association.
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3.34 In 1966, IK&R began to provide, in addition to normal depreciation,
allowance for the increased costs involved in replacing existing facilities
with more modern equipment. The 1966 provision is confined to steam
locomotives and passenger cars; the revised forecasts for 1967 and onwards
include provision for freight cars and other equipmenit.
3.35 The composition of the long-term debt as of December 31, 1966,
is given in Table 9. The terms of the loans range from 15 to 25 years,
with interest rates of 5-3/4 and 6%. The debt/equity ratio is satisfactory
3.36 The current ratio at 114/1 is low but adequate. At December 31,
1966, the liquid ratio dropped to 0.6/1, largely because of a substantial
increase in accounts payable. The Government has agreed that it will
enable KNR to maintain at all times an adequate liquid position; proposed
increases in tariffs should result in more working capital becoming
available to KNR from 1968 onwards (para. 5.9).
Budget, Accounts and Audit
3.37 Operating and capital budgets are prepared in two forms, one
as laid down for Government Departments and the other based on the accounting
system recently installed by the consultants financed under Credit 25-KO.
Similarly, two sets of accounts are maintained because KUR, as presently
constituted, cannot abandon the Governmental budgetary and accounting rules
and regulations. The Government form of budget is too rigid and the
Director-General of KUR has no power to reallocate funds between sub-heads
of account, such adjustments being authorized only by the Minister of
Finance. Arrangements have been introduced recently whereby immediate
action is taken to reallocate amounts in the budget from one item to
another on request by the Director General of KNR. This will suffice
until KNR is constituted into a corporate or other legal entity divorced
from Government rules and regulations.
3.38 The consultants appointed under Credit 25-KO have prepared a
performance budget system which, under the present set-up, cannot be used
by KNR. Should the latter be constituted into a corporation or other
more autonomous legal entity, it should make use of the performance budget
system, possibly at first in a more simplified form, and assurances in
this respect were obtained during the negotiations.
3.39 The modern commercial accounting system installed by the same
consultants is working reasonably well, but there is a need to revise some
of the accounting classifications in order to facilitate costing of
individual traffics and to readily ascertain major costs. Accurate and
meaningful statistics, essential for the production of traffic costs and
for management control, are not readily available due (a) to divided
control of their preparation by the traffic and accounts departments
and (b) to compilation still being performed manually. KNR is currently
studying both problems and will also obtain the assistance of consultants
(see Annex).
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3.4o External audit is carried out by the Ministry of Finance to
confirm that expenses have been properly authorized and are in accordance
with the approved budget. As a result of negotiations for Credit 25-KO,
KNR since 1965 has a second set of accounts, kept in accordance with
principles of commercial accounting; these accounts have not so far been
audited. However, in connection with the recent USAID loan, the Govern-
ment undertook to engage a suitable accounting firm to examine KNR's
commercial accounts for 1966 and to report upon the adequacy of its
accounting procedures. Negotiations with U.S. accounting firms have
been protracted and the appointment is only now being finalized: it is on
the basis that the firm appointed will make a partial audit for 1966,
which will include a review of the income statement, and a full audit for
1967. The auditor's reports will be made available to the Association.
As for the future, it has been agreed during negotiations that MMR will
have its commercial accounts audited annually by an independent auditor
acceptable to the Association promptly after the end of each fiscal year
and will promptly furnish to the Association copies of such reports.
4. THE PROJECT
The 1967-1971 Development Program
4.1 The transportation survey made by consultants in 1965/66 recom-
mended a KNR development program for the period 1967-1971 of 65 billion
Won (US$ 245 million equivalent), with a foreign exchange component of
US$ 77 million equivalent. The Government and ICR accepted this program
with some variations in detail but none in total. The Association also
accepts the main features of the Program but considers that it is in
excess of the technical and financial capacity of KNPR and could be reduced,
without adverse consequences, to a total of 57.4 billion Won (US$ 217 mil-
lion equivalent), of which, the estimated foreign exchange component would
be US$ 68 million equivalent. Agreement was reached during negotiations
on this program amount and on its contents, details of which are given
below and in Table 10. In addition, work carried over from the 1962-1966
Program, to be completed in 1967, is estimated to cost 6.2 billion Won
(US$ 23 million equivalent). Thus, the total investment for the period
1967-1971 amounts to 63.6 billion Won (US$ 240 million equivalent).
(1) Construction of new lines (llo of total expenditure).
Five lines of a total length of 15h kn: two lines totalling 36 km
are to serve coal mines; two lines totalling 38 km are to serve
and interconnect developing industrial areas; and one line of 80 kmi,
between Jin Ju and Sun Cheon, begun under the 1962-1966 Program will
be completed to improve access from the west of Korea to the main port
of Pu San.
(2) Increase in station and line capacity (17% of total
expenditure). Heavy increasing traffic requires the extension of
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station and other facilities in the Seoul area; the provision of
marshalling yards at key junctions; the improvement of loading and
unloading facilities at many stations and freight yards; and the
installation of signalling and track extensions.
(3) Way and structure renewals and improvements (10% of total
expenditure). 37 kg/m rails are to be replaced by 50 kg/m rails to
permit the extended use of heavier and more powerful diesel locomotives;
wooden ties are to be renewed by concrete ties; old bridges are to
be strengthened; and mechanical maintenance equipment is to be brought
increasingly into use.
(4) Motive power and rolling stock (52% of total expenditure).
51 diesel locomotives, 97 diesel rail cars and 1,800 freight cars to
be procured overseas. 755 passenger cars and 3,819 freight cars to
replace overage uneconomic stock and to provide additional capacity,
to be built locally.
(5) Rolling stock equipment and construction (7% of total
expenditure). Increases in motive power and rolling stock require
the improving of maintenance sheds and workshops; the replacement
of obsolete equipment; the provision of additional machinery and
plant; and the purchase of adequate spares, mainly from overseas.
(6) Miscellaneous (3% of total expenditure). Includes
improvements to communications, office mechanization and consulting
services.
4.2 The specific changes in the Government/KNR Program which were
agreed in negotiations are:
(1) Slowing down of track relaying and improvements to some
70% of the work proposed. This is more consistent with past performance
by KNR of this type of work which is adversely affected by heavy
traffic density and severe climatic conditions.
(2) Deferring of major remodeling of the railroad layout at
Ul San, mainly for city planning purposes.
(3) Rephasing over a longer period of large scale engineering
works, mainly in the heavily built up Seoul area.
(4) Exclusion of luxury items, such as special sleeping and
observation cars.
(5) Increased provision for consulting services in specific
areas. Outlines of the services to be provided are in the Annex.
(6) Increased provision for the purchase of spares required
to maintain or improve availability of locomotives and rolling stock.
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(7) Carrying over of some expenditure on equipment purchased
in the last year of the Program period.
4.3 In addition to the Program, KNR had planned to carry out 14
billion Won (US$ 53 million equivalent) of "Non-Program" investment in
the same period - 5.75 billion Won for six new railroad lines totalling
273 km and 8.25 billion Won for transferring the Yong San workshops in
Seoul to Dae Jeon. With regard to the new lines, details of the various
proposals are given in Table 11, and locations are shown on the map.
The program lines are related to known heavy traffic development or to
economies in operation. The non-program lines are for the most part
promotional and political and have not been the subject of adequate
economic feasibility studies. As the KNR program by itself is as large
as KNR can hope to finance, and in view of the need to establish
effective coordination policies between road and rail (para. 2.11), it
has been agreed that further work on the non-program lines will be post-
poned until coordination machinery has been set up by the Government,
adequate engineering and economic feasibility studies have been made, and
the Association is consulted. With regard to the removal of the Seoul
workshops to Dae Jeon, this is unnecessary at present for EIER purposes
and agreement to postpone the proposed work was obtained in negotiations.
4.4 The transportation survey identified seven existing lines which
are not yielding revenues sufficient to cover costs. INR will use
consultants to review the economics of these lines in detail, with a view
to reaching agreement with the Association on an appropriate program of
action.
Description of the Project
4.5 The Project consists of the first three years of KNR's Develop-
ment Program, 1967-1971, as revised above. The total cost of the Project,
excluding the 6.2 billion Won carried fonrard from the 1962-1966 Program,
is estimated at about 36.3 billion Won, equivalent to US$ 137 million,
with a foreign exchange component of about us$ 40.3 million equivalent of
which US$ 11.0 million would be provided by the proposed credit. The
principal items in the Project are described briefly below:
---Estimated Cost (in millions)---
Local Foreign Total
U.S.$
Won IWon equivalent Won
I. Items to be financed by
the proposed creGit
600 hopper cars 72 1,44h 5.451 1,516
450 tank cars 54 1,263 4.765 1,317
Consulting services 30 132 .500 162
15 2 10.716 2,995
Contingencies (3%) 16 76 .284 92
Sub-Total I 172 2,9 -11.000 3,037
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--- Estimated Cost (in millions)---
Local Foreign Total
U.S.$
Won Won equivalent Won
II. Other Items
Construction of new lines 4,168 972 3.669 5,140
Increase in station and line
capacity 4,648 509 1.920 5,157
Way and structure renewals and
improvements 2,056 1,038 3.912 3,094
Motive power and rolling stock 11,221 2,674 10.084 13,895
Rolling stock equipment and
construction 678 1,709 6.449 2,387
Miscellaneous 326 170 654 496
23,097 7,072 26.688 0,1679
Contingencies (10%) 2,309 708 2.669 3,017
Sub-Total II 25,06 7,780 29.357 33,18
TOTAL (I and II) 25,578 10,695 40.357 36,273
A breakdown of "Other Items" is given in Table 10.
4.6 The Project is of the right order of magnitude and generally
well-conceived in relation to rapidly expanding traffic requirements and
IGR's financial and technical resources. KNR has agreed to consult with
the Association before incurring any substantial capital expenditure out-
side the Program.
4.7 The items to be financed by the proposed credit are all high
priority requirements. The 600 hopper cars are to carry coal which cons-
titutes some 40% of all freight traffic and is conservatively estimated to
increase from 10.0 million to 12.6 million tons during the Project period.
The provision of the hopper cars, however, must be accompanied by the
provision of appropriate coal offloading facilities, particularly at Seoul
(para. 3.15). Until these facilities are improved, the hopper cars cannot
be used to full advantage. As indicated in para. 3.15 KNR will employ
consultants to report on this matter and the Government will support
effective follow through action.
4.8 The 450 tank cars (out of a total of 500 planned to be imported
during the Project period) are required to meet an anticipated growth in
oil traffic. The existing refinery at Ul San has been enlarged this year
and a second refinery at Yeo Su is expected to come "on stream" in 1969.
In 1966, 700,000 tons of oil were carried by 952 tank cars. In 1969, an
estimated 2,040,000 tons are to be carried by 1,769 tank cars. Present
tank car operations are not satisfactory (para. 3.19) and the new cars
with 25%o higher net load capacity (from 40 to 50 tons), with facilities
to defreeze oil enroute and with better design giving better turn-round,
7would be expected to double present performance in ton-kmi, which would
then be adequate. Pipelines will not be used in connection with the two
named refineries but may be considered for a third refinery, if built,
in the In Cheon-Seoul area.
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4.9 The service of consultants would be used as indicated in the
Annex to help E R reach the most economical solutbions to coal handling
problems -in the Seoul area; to advise on new marshalling yards; to help
with rolling stock maintenance and repair problems; to advise on the
design of new rolling stock to be purchased from overseas and to be built
locally; and to review the economics of and recommend appropriate action
for uneconomic lines. In addition, there arc important traffic costing
and statistical studies currently scheduled to be carried out under a
USAID loan agreement (paras. 3.29, 3.39 and 3.40). The Association is
maintaining contact with USAID on the status and scope of these studies;
the amount provided for consultants under the proposed credit would allow
of some assistance with the foreign exchange cost should this prove
necessary.
4.10 The estimated cost of the hopper cars and tank cars has been adjusted
on the basis of quotat4:)ns received and o:-ders placed in India in September
(para. 4.13). The cars will be imported largely assembled and ready for
use. Local costs include port charges and fees and some assembly and
painting costs. TLe estirmates are reliable and the cont.ingency provision,
making allo-wance for possible financing of consulLing services, is considered
sufficient.
Financin, of the Project
4.11 Investment during the Project period, 1967-1969, including
expenditure carried forvard from the 1962-1966 Piogram, would amount to
42.5 billion Won (US$ 160 million equivalent) to be financed 56% out of
internally-generated funds and 44% from borrowing) details of the fi-
nancing plan over the Project period (1967-1969) and the Program period
(1967-1971) are in paras. 5.6 and 5.7 and in Table 13.
4.12 The proposed credit provides for the foreign exchange component
cost of the hopper cars, tank cars and consulting services, which repre-
sents only a snnall portion (%"Q) of the Project. If there are savings in
the IDA-financed items, it is proposed that these be used to finance the
foreign exchange component cost of additional project items to be deter-
mined in agreement with KNR.
Execution of the Project
4.13 MiR is competent, with the help of consultants, to carry out the
Project. Because of the urgency to meet the traffic needs, the Government
of Korea authorized, at its own risk, KNR to issue invitations to bid for
both the hopper cars and tank cars on an international competitive basis,
in May, 1967. The procedure was satisfactory to the Association, which
reviewed the tender documents. At the request of the Association, KNR
also employed consultants to advise on the designs and specifications for
both types of car. The Government and KNR hope that delivery of the cars
might be achieved in the first quarter of 1968. It is expected that no
payments will be made before the date of the proposed Credit Agreement and
that progress payments should be scheduled as follows:
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Up to Up to
Items Dec. 1968 Dec. 1969 Total
(US$ million equivalent)
Hopper cars 4.90 0.55 5.45
Tank cars 4.30 0.47 4.77
Consult-ing services 0.30 0.20 0.50
Contingencies 07i7
9.50 1.22 11.00
5. FUTURE EARNINGS AND FINATCES
Tariffs
5.1 As indicated in paras. 3.26 to 3.28, the present overall level
of tariffs is very low and insufficient for ONR to achieve a reasonable
rate of return on its investment. The Government agrees and proposes
increases of 30o' in freight rates and 50%0 in passenger fares to be
effective on or before January 1, 1968. These increases will still leave
ICR charges among the lowest of any railroad wihich has been the subject
of Bank/Association lending. The rather smaller increase in freight rates
reflects the Government's wish to keep freight transportation costs as low
as possible. It is not expected that the increase in freight rates will
have any appreciable effect on the growth in traffic. The increase in
passenger fares is comparatively steep and public reaction may result in
a fall in traffic in 1968, but the upward trend in passenger traffic is
reasonably expected to resume in 1969.
Forecast Operating Results
5.2 A detailed operating income and expenditure forecast 1967-1971
is given in Table 12. It reflects the above tariff increases and possible
effects on traffic. It also takes into account substantial rises in wages
and salaries to be applied in 1968, and the cost of moving the growing
traffic expected over the period; on the other hand, the forecast makes
allowance for economies resulting from complete dieselization and from
other measures to improve efficiency which are recommended in this report.
Gross operating revenue is expected to rise from 15.7 billion lWon in 1966
to 34.2 billion Won in 1971, an average annual increase of 23%, while
operating expenses, including provisions for depreciation and modernization,
would increase from 1h.9 billion Won in 1966 to 25.8 billion Won in 1971,
an average annual increase of 14%. In 1971 the allowances for depreciation
and modernization would together be some 17% of gross operating revenue.
KIR has based the allowances on the tentative results of the revaluations
of assets recently undertaken which is yet to be agreed with the auditors
being appointed under the recent USAID loan (para. 3.33). IMR has agreed
that depreciation wfill be based on the replacement value of all depreciable
fixed assets and their useful life calculated in accordance with sound
accounting principles.
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5.3 The following is a summary of operating revenue and expenditure
forecasts during the period 1967-1971.
----------------------Won billion -------------------------
Gross Depreciation and Net
Operating lWorking Cash Modernization Operating
Revenue Expenses Surplus Provisions Revenue
1967 20.4 14.4 6.o 3.5 2.5
1968 27.1 15.8 11.3 4.0 7.3
1969 30.0 17.3 12.7 h.6 8.1
1970 32.0 18.7 13.3 5.5 7.8
1971 34.3 19.8 14.5 6.0 8.5
The operating ratio, which was 95 in 1966, is expected to improve to 73 in
1969, at the end of the Project period, and to be 75 in 1971, at the end
of the Program period. Interest ratios, between 3.1/1 and 5.3/1, and debt
coverage ratios, between 4.2/1 and 5.5/1, assessed in accordance with assump-
tions explained in para. 5.8, are both satisfactory.
5.4 The rate of return on average net fixed assets in use should
improve from 1.5% in 1966 to 4.8% in 1968 and 5% in 1969. During negotia-
tions it was agreed that a return of 6% should be reached by 1971 calculated
on the audited valuation of the fixed assets.
5.5 The operating income forecasts described in para. 5.2 do not
provide for possible increases in costs beyond 1968. It was agreed during
negotiations that should this occur and KNR be in danger of failing to
achieve the agreed rates of return, KNR should propose, and the Government
should approve, the necessary measures, including tariff adjustments,
promptly to correct the situation. It is not possible now to quantify
specific provision in amount for tariff increases after those of June 1968.
Before this can be done it wiU be necessary for the review of the
revaluation of fixed assets (para. 5.2) to have taken place and to know
the results of the review of costsandtariffs (3.29) which should in itself
result in some increases of rates and fares. As indicated in the preceding
paragraph, the Government has agreed to a rate of return of 6% by 1971, and
it would take such measures, whether by tariff increases or otherwise, as
may be necessary to assure the timely fulfillment of this undertaking.
Forecast Cash Flow
5.6 The estimated cash needs and sources of funds required by KNR
over the period 1967-1971 are detailed in Table 13; they are summarized
below for the Project period (1967-1969) and for the Program period
(1967-1971):
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(Won billion)
1967-1969 1967-1971
Funds Required
Capital Investment 42.5 63.6
Debt Service 6.8 14.2
Total 77.
Funds Available
Internally-generated funds 33.3 58.2
Borrowing:
Foreign - Existing loans 8.1 8.1
Proposed loans - O.E.C.F.
(Japan) 4.0 6.9
- I.D.A.
Credit 2.9 2.9
- Other 1.9 6.2
- .8 16.o
Local - Existing loan 1.7 1.7
S/total Borrowing 18.6 25.8
Total 52.O 81.0
5.7 For the period 1967-1971 cash generated from operations, 58.2
billion Won, together with a loan of 1.7 billion Won from the Korean Re-
construction Bank, would cover debt service (11.2 billion Won) and finance
all local currency costs of capital investment (39.5 billion Won). Cash
resources at the end of the period would be increased by 6.2 billion Won.
Of the foreign exchange costs (24.1 billion Won), 8.1 billion Won would
come from existing foreign loans and 2.9 billion Won from the proposed
IDA credit, leaving 13.1 billion Won to be secured. KNR expects to obtain
6.9 billion Won from Japan and 6.2 billion Won from other sources.
Subject to reasonable lending conditions, borrowing of such magnitude is
within the repayment capacity of KNR and the financial plan described
above is suitable.
5.8 The cash flow has been prepared on the assumption that the
borrowing to be secured would be on terms ranging from 15 to 25 years,
including a three-year period of grace, with an overall interest rate
of 6% p.a. Likewise, the proposed IDA credit is assumed to be made
available by the Government to KM for a term of 25 years, including
three years of grace, also at 6% interest. No allowance has been made
for the financing of "non-program"l items (para. 4.3). The Government
has agreed that in the event the expected foreign and local loans cannot
be obtained on reasonable terms, it will rmake available to KNR, on terms
and conditions satisfactory to the Association, all funds necessary to
carry out the Project and the Program.
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Forecast Balance Sheets
5.9 The forecast balance sheet position, 1967-1971, is given in
Table 1 and is summarized below.
(Won billion)
1967 1971
Net current assets 2 15
Net fixed assets 161 190
Other assets 2 2
Total 1 207
Mqodernization provision 2 7
Debt 21 31
Equity 1J2 169
Total 16; 207
Although total debt is expected to increase by some 260%, from 12 billion
Won in 1966 to 31 billion Won in 1971, the debt/equity ratio will not
exceed 16/84 which is favorable. The current ratio will rise to almost
5/1 and the liquid ratio to 3.2/1,both of which are satisfactory.
6. ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION
Introduction
6.1 Investments contained in the MNR's Development Program are
primarily designed to increase capacity to meet rapidly growing traffic
demands. Since most of the KNR's traffic consists of commodities such
as coal, ore, oil, fertilizer and cement which are clearly rail-oriented
and suited to the use of large freight cars and, often, consolidated
train-loads, there is considerable scope for the purchase of more powerful
locomotives, larger cars and heavier track. Such investments would help
to modernize equipment and reduce operating costs.
6.2 The Development Program is part of Korea's Second Five-Year
Development Plan (1967-71). It is based on the recommendations of a
Bank-financed Transportation Survey which sought, inter alia, to establish
the proper roles of the different transport modes in Korea. At the present
time the railroad system provides the only network connecting all parts
of the country with the large commercial and industrial centers of Seoul
and Pu San. Natural conditions limit river transport and coastal shipping.
The development of an adequate highway system capable of sustaining heavy
traffic loads is handicapped by difficult terrain, and its completion is
many years away. In these circumstances, development of the railway
network is essential to the continued growth of the economy.
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Traffic Forecasts
6.3 KNR expects freight traffic to grow about 11% per year during
1967-1971, wsith commercial traffic, as distinct from military movements
and KNR service traffic, averaging a growth of over 12% annually. Passen-
ger traffic should increase over 8% per year over the same period. These
forecasts are somewhat higher than those calculated in the Transportation
Survey and reflect a GNP growth of 8% annually during the Second Plan
period, which is higher than forecast at the time of that survey. The
freight traffic forecast corresponds closely with experience over the
previous five years (1962-1966) while passenger traffic forecasts reflect
the growth rate since 1955. They are considered reasonable.
6.4 Freight traffic is expected to grow from 5.45 billion ton-kmi in
1966 to 8.96 billion ton-km in 1971 (Tables 5 and 15). Passenger traffic
is estimated to reach 13 billion pass-km in 1971, as compared with the
1966 level of 8.7 billion. Substantial amounts of additional equipment
will be required to handle these increased quantities although much
emphasis will be placed on larger and more efficient equipment.
Motive Power Requirements
6.5 Dieselization of the KiNR will shortly be complete; delivery of
79 main line diesels in the current year will permits the withdrawal from
service of 242 old steam engines by the end of 1968. The exceptional
replacement ratio of 1 diesel for 3 steam locomotives (as against a more
usual ratio of 2 to 5) indicates an economic rate of return higher than
the 12% - 15% usually associated with dieselization. It is made possible
by the purchase of powerful diesels to cope with the difficult grades
frequently encountered on the KNR system, in place of underpowered steam
engines many of which have been used intensively through two major wars.
The latest diesel purchases will also permit the redistribution of
existing smaller diesels to shunting duties, with marked economy in
utilization.
Rolling Stock
6.6 The 12R Development Program provides for 5,600 new freight cars,
4,200 for additional traffic and 1,h00 for replacements. About 2,900
additional cars will become available during the Project period (1967-69),
including 600 coal hopper cars and 450 ta,4-i cars to be provided under the
proposed credit. All the new cars will have a capacity of about 50 tons,
as against tile current average capacity of 35. Additionally, technical
improvements, such as roller bearings, are expected to yield a further 5%
in availability. The increase in earning capacity (about 45%) and the
reduction in maintenance costs should assure an economic rate of return
close to 20% over a 25-year life span.
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6.7 The 2,900 additional cars to be delivered through 1969 will not
fully correct the present situation in which the XNR is unable to carry
all the traffic offered; however, the supply is geared to the physical
and technical limitations of KNR. By 1971, the supply of rail freight
transport should be in balance with anticipated requirements.
6.8 The 600 50-ton coal hopper cars to be provided through IDA
financing will, under present operating conditions, be sufficient to
meet the additional coal traffic demand through the Project period
(1967-69). With improved coal terminal facilities to be constructed
over the next five years the productivity of the entire hopper fleet of
2,071 cars (1,471 on hand plus 600 under the Project) should increase
sufficiently to ensure that by 1971 all major coal movements will move
by mechanized hopper car, releasing gondolas for more suitable traffic.
6.9 Oil traffic is expected to more than double between 1967 and
1969, reaching 677 million ton-km in that year. The 500 50-ton oil tank
cars to be imported, bringing the tank fleet total to 1,769, should
provide ample capacity for this traffic. However, at present, KNR tank
car utilization averages only 250,000 ton-km per year. New operating
techniques should increase this to at least 400,000 ton-km by 1969 and
higher levels thereafter to ensure adequate capacity at least until the
end of 1971.
6.10 KNR plans to build 755 new coaches and ancillary vehicles
locally during 1967-71 and scrap 200 which are 35 or more years old.
The replacement cars will be only half the weight of the old vehicles,
but have equal carrying capacity. Additionally, maintenance costs will
be cut in half. This will result in greater train capacity, higher
speeds and increased utilization. The economic rate of return will
approximate 25% on the replacement coaches, even if benefits are limited
to 10 years, representing the maximum remaining useful life which could
be expected from the old vehicles if they were not replaced now. The
new additional stock, badly needed to meet anticipated traffic demands,
will yield an economic rate of return of about 16% over 25 years.
Altogether, an increase of at least 48% in traffic capacity is expected,
which is sufficient for the volume of traffic expected through 1971.
Way and Structure renewals and improvements
6.11 Investments in way and structures are largely concentrated in
the replacement of existing worn 37 kg/m rail, laid in 10 m lengths, with
50 kg/m rail in 20 m lengths. This program is directly associated with
the increasing use of heavier motive power and rolling stock. The present
program will increase the proportion of 50 kg/m rail from 25% to about
40% by 1971.
6.12 The benefits accruing from the use of the heavier rail relate
largely to the use of heavier equipment. Moreover, the 50 kglm rail,
while more expensive, is cheaper to maintain than 37 kg/m rail and
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has a longer life. These advantages collectively yield an economic rate
of return in excess of 10. Since it is ultimately intended to convert
the rails into long continuous trackage, an additional benefit will result
from the fact that only half the number of welds will be required.
New Lines
6.13 Five new lines are to be constructed during the Program period,
totally 154 km. All have been endorsed by the Transportation Survey as
justifiable and consistent with highway development plans.
(a) Gyeong Jeon Line (80 km) was begun under the 1962-66
Program and is half complete. This line will reduce connections between
Pu San and the southwestern area of the country by an average of 200 km.
(b) Jeong Seon Line (24 km) and (c) Mun Gyeong Line (12 km) -
these are spurs to coal-mining areas scheduled to produce 0.6 and 1.3
million tons annually, respectively.
(d) Bi In Line (22 km) - also in the nature of a spur line to
serve a new industrial area, and shorter distances for traffic in that
direction.
(e) Jang Hang Line (16 km) - to provide a direct link between
Bi In and the south and shorter distances for traffic in that direction.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOI-REMDATIONS
7.1 IG1R's Development Program, 1967-1971, revised as recommended
in this report and exclusive of "non-program" items, is generally well-
conceived. Its implementation is of high priority for the economic
development of Korea. The Project, which consists of the first three
years of the Program, is technically, economically and financially sound.
Cost estimates appear to be reliable and procurement procedures for the
IDA-financed project items are in accordance with the Association's
requirements.
7.2 In spite of some organizational and staff deficiencies, the
management and operation of KNR are generally satisfactory and its financial
position is expected to become satisfactory through the proposed rate and
fare increases.
7.3 During negotiations, assurances were obtained from the Government
and KiR on:
(i) Future organization and budgetary arrangements of KNR (paras. 3.1,
3.37 and 3.38);
(ii) Scope of consulting services (paras. 3.2, 3.14, 3.15, 3.29,
3.39, 4.7, 4.9 and Annex);
(iii) Staffing policies (para. 3.5), tariff increases (para. 5.1),
targets for rates of return (para. 5.4) and Government financing
(para. 5.8).
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7.4 The Project would be a suitable basis for an IDA credit of
US$ 11.0 million equivalent to the Governrment of Korea, to be made
available to MIR at 6% interest for a term of 25 years, including three
years of grace.
November 21, 1967
Table 1
IMO
SECOND RAILM0UO PROJi3CT
FREIGHT T?A.NSPORT BY I4ODE*
Year Railroad** Truck Coastal Shipping Total
(i) Ifllion Tons
1955 5.0 2.0 1.0 8.0
1956 5.6 3.3 1.0 9.9
1957 7.0 5.3 1.0 13.3
1958 7.3 5.7 1.2 14.2
1959 9.0 6.4 0.9 16.3
1960 10.2 o.7 1.0 17.9
1961 11.1 9.9 1.2 22.2
1962 13.1 11.0 1.6 25.7
1963 15.7 10.4 1.9 28,0
1964 16.8 12.2 2.2 31.2
1965 18.9 12.2 2.7 33.8
1966 20.3 IN/A N/ N/A
(ii) Billion Ton-Km
1955 1.06 0.10 0.20 1.36
l956 1.30 0.17 0.20 1.67
1957 1.61 0.27 0.20 2.08
1958 1.76 0.29 0.24 2.29
1959 2.15 0.32 0.18 2.65
1960 2.83 0.34 0.20 3.02
1961 2.70 0.30 0.24 3.24
1962 3.26 0.37 0.32 3,95
1963 3.61 0.41 0.36 4.0
1964 3.88 0.48 0.39 4.75
1965 4.43 0.48 0.39 5.30
1966 4.76 N/A N/A NA/
* Freight transport by air is negligible.
**~ Commercial freight only.
Table 2
KOREA
SECOND RAILROAD PROJECT
PASSENGER TRANSPORT BY MODE
Year Railroad Highways Air Coastal Shipping Total
(i) Millions of Passengers
1955 57.3 48.0 * * 105.30
1956 66.3 53.0 0.04 * 119.34
1957 53.4 70.0 0.06 * 123.46
1958 70.1 72.0 0.05 * 142.15
1959 71.5 92.0 0.07 * 163.57
1960 75.7 105.0 0.07 4.o 184.77
1961 88.3 116.0 0.06 3.7 208.06
1962 100.6 139.0 0.05 4.4 244.05
1963 109.3 145.0 0.09 4.5 258.89
1964 118.5 180.0 0.18 5.9 304.58
1965 107.2 240.0 0.21 5.5 352.91
1966 138.0 * * * *
(ii) Billions of Pass-km
1955 3.71 0.90 0.01 0.10 4.72
1956 4.05 0.99 0.01 0.11 5.16
1957 3.43 1.31 0.02 0.11 4.87
1958 4.17 1.39 0.02 0.12 5.70
1959 4.54 1.79 0.02 0.14 6.49
1960 4.94 2.04 0.02 0.15 7.15
1961 5.37 2.24 0.02 0.14 7.77
1962 5.87 2.74 0.02 0.16 8.79
1963 6.68 2.89 0.03 0.18 9.78
1964 7.35 3.59 0.05 0.21 11.20
1965 6.92 4.80 o.o6 0.21 11.99
1966 8.66 * * * *
*Data not available.
SECOND RAUIRpAD FROJECT
Zomposition of Motive Powier and Rolling Stock as at Dec. 31.
1966 through 1971 (excluding narrow gauge lines 1/).
Actual Forecast 1971 over 1966
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 + or -
1. Motive Power 2/
Steam locomotives 242 140 70 - - - -242
Diesel Shunting locomotives 13 44 47 49 52 56 + 43
Diesel mainline locomotives 160 208 205 211 229 247 + 87
Diesel railcar units 163 163 163 183 215 260 + 97
Total (excluding steam) 336 415 415 443 496 563 +227
2. Passenger Car Stock I/
Passenger and sleeping cars 1,283 1,308 1,411 1,507 1,602 1,682 +399
Mail & baggage cars 115 145 157 170 183 196 + 81
Heater vans 51 86 96 106 116 126 + 75
Total 1,449 1,539 1,664 1,783 1,901 2,004 +555
3. Freight Car Stock 4/
Box cars 4,113 4,772 5,022 5,542 5,712 6,032 +1,919
Gondolas 3,403 3,447 3,404 3,362 3,612 3,762 + 359
Hopper cars 1,471 1,471 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 + 600
Tank cars 952 1,169 1,669 1,769 1,769 1,769 + 817
Others 1,100 1,234 1,214 1,194 1,393 1,591 + 491
Total 11,039 12,093 13,380 13,938 14,557 15,225 +4,186
Notes: 1/ Narrow gauge lines: Su In (53 km) and Su Yeo (73 Ion). Steam operated. Retention requires study before any
major investment.
2/ Motive Power: All additional mainline locomotives to be imported after 1968 to be larger, type 2000-2400 h.p.
Present largest are 1826 h.p. Shunting locomotives to be provided i) by relegating existing
SW8 and G8 locomotives (800 h.p. approx.) to these duties antd ii) by purchase of 10 small
shunting locos.
3/ Passenger cars, etc: 1967-71
To be built locally 
To be placed out of service 200*-
Total additions 5
*350 cars scheduled to be scrapped but 150 will
be rebuilt locally and retained.
4/ Freight cars:
1967-71
To be built locally 3,819**
To be imported 1 800**
To be placed out of service 1 433-**
Total additions 4,106
""All imported cars and most new locally built cars
to be 50-ton capacity. Present maximum 40 tons per car.
.H-82,500 scheduled to be scrapped but 1,067 will be
rebuilt locally and retained.
Table Is
KOREA
SECOND R&ILfiAD PROJECT
Summary of Operating Statistics (all traffic)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
I. TRAFFIC
Pass-km 000,000 5,372 5,869 6,576 7,323 6,917 8,665
Net ton-kin 000,000 3,486 3,977 4,358 4,522 5,044 5,450
Traffic unit 000,000 8,858 9,846 10,934 11,845 11,961 14,115
II. OPERATION
TRAIN Steam 000 7,800 8,899 8,918 5,671 6,879 7,713
KM Diesel 000 11,100 11,613 13,149 16,275 17,002 17,924
Railcar 000 1,000 1,593 2,939 5,787 6,164 6,433
Total 000 19,900 22,105 25,0o6 27,468 30,045 32,070
ENGINE Steam 000 11,900 13,230 13,443 9,906 11,636 13,181
KM Diesel 000 14,000 13,949 15,546 19,116 19,088 21,208
Railcar 000 1,100 2,295 5,186 9,439 9,o60 10,150
NUMBER OF ENGINES IN FLEET
Steam 350 280 280 272 272 242
Diesel 95 95 125 125 125 173 1/
Railcar 18 31 81 80 77 163 2/
Total 463 406 486 477 474 578
ENGINE KM/ENGINE/DAY IN FLEET
Steam 94 119 132 100 117 139
Diesel 402 403 341 419 417 428
Railcar 167 203 176 323 322 320
NUMBER OF ENGINES AVAILABLE
Diesel 92 93 98 121 122 133 3/
Railcar 15 25 40 69 66 72 3/
ENGINE KM/ENGINE DAY AVAILABIE
Diesel 411 410 455 433 431 436
Railcar 251 250 356 375 376 385
TRAFFIC UNIT/Engine Unit
in Fleet 000,000 19.2 24.2 22.5 24.9 25.2 28.9 _/
PASS.KM /Train km 446 445 437 431 398 439
PASS.KM/Passenger car
in fleet 000,000 4.9 4.5 4.1 5.8 5.0 6.2
/Passenger car/km 48.9 63.1 62.0 59.2 54.4 62.9
NET TON.KM/Freight car
in fleet 000 370 407 416 422 476 519
Number of freight cars
loaded 000 536 617 664 665 735 765
Average turn-around of
freight cars day 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4
Average load of freight
cars ton 28.1 28.6 28.8 29.1 29.5 30.6
III. STAFF
Number of permanent employees
26,316 27,570 26,218 27,639 29,548 29,976
Traffic unit 000/employee 336 357 417 428 405 471
1/ 48 locomotives delivered at varying times through 1966 gave equivalent of 10 additional locomotives
in the full year.
2/ 1 railcar rebuilt. 85 railcars delivered at varying ttmes throughout 1966 gave ecuivalent of 18
additional railcars in the full year.
3/ Figures must be related to explanatory notes 1/ and 2/.
4/ Divisor of 487 (257 steam + 135 diesel + 95 railcars).
KOREA
SECOND RAILROAD PROJECT
FREIGHT TRAFFIC
Tons Transported. (millions)L Ton-lkm (bilnions)
Railroad Railroad Average travel
Commercial Military Service Conmercial Military Service distance
Freight Freight _reig ht Total Freight Freight Frea Total
1955 5.0 4.0 1.4 10.4 1.06 0.81 0.18 2.06 198.7
1956 5.6 4.0 1.4 11.0 1.30 0.7h 0.23 2.27 205.9
1957 7.0 3.7 1.3 12.0 1.61 0.75 0.21 2.57 214.0
1958 7.3 3.4 1.4 12.1 1.76 0.70 0.20 2.66 219.9
1959 9.0 3.2 1.5 13.7 2.15 o.66 0.26 3.07 223.0
1960 10.2 2.8 1.4 14.4 2.48 0.56 0.24 3.28 227.6
1961 11.1 2.9 1.4 15.4 2.70 0.55 0.24 3.49 226.7
1962 13.1 2.4 1.4 17.9 3.26 0.48 0.24 3.98 222.0
1963 15.7 2.3 1.8 19.8 3.61 0.46 0.29 4.36 220.4
1964 16.8 2.1 1.4 20.3 3.88 0.39 0.23 4.49 222.6
1965 18.9 2.1 1.4 22.4 4.43 0.39 0.23 5.04 224.0 Q
1966 20.3 2.1 1.7 24.1 4.76 0.40 0.29 5.45 226.1
KOREA
SECOND RAILROAD PROJECT
Analysis of Commercial Freight Traffic, 1955-1966
(millions of tons)
12 1956 19578 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 196 1966
Coal 1.3 1.5 2.1 2.4 3.5 4.4 5.1 6.5 7.6 8.3 8.9 10.0
Fertilizer 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.8 1,7
Cement 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 o.6 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.7
Grain o.4 0.4 0.4 o.4 0.4 o.6 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2
Ore* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.4 0.4 0.6 o.6 1.0 1.0
Timber 0.4 0.5 o.6 0.5 o.6 o.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 o.4 o.4 0.4
Oil 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 o.4 o.6 o.7
Other 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.4 3.6 3.8 3.5 3.4
Total 5.0 5.6 7.0 7.9 9.0 10.2 11.1 13.1 15.7 16.8 18.8 20.1
*For 1955-1960 included under "other".
KOREA
SECOND RAILROAD PROJECT
Summary Income Accounts 1962 - 1966 (Won billion)
----1 9 6 2------ ----1 9 6 3------ ---1 9 6 4-- -- 1 9 6 5 -- ---1 9 6 6------
Appraisal Appraisal Appraisal Appraisal Appraisal
Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual
Operating Revenue:
Passenger 3.81 3.75 4.05 4.26 4.34 5.32 4.60 6.57 4.86 8.38
Freight 2.91 3.07 3.30 3.88 3.47 4.50 3.65 5.54 3.88 6.05
Other 0.10 0.28 0.11 0.25 0.12 0.55 0.13 0.98 0.14 1.27
Total Operating
Revenue 6.82 7.10 7.46 8.39 7.93 10.37 8.38 13.09 8.88 15.70
Operating Expenses:
Before Depreciation 6.20 4.83 6.39 5.63 6.20 7.71 6.15 9.60 6.42 13.39
Depreciation 0.97 1.97 1.07 1.90 1.13 2.05 1.20 1.99 1.27 1.53
Total Operating
Expenses 7.17 6.80 7.46 7.53 7.33 9.76 7.35 1l.>9 7.69 14.92
Net Operating
Revenue (loss) (0.55) 0.30 .0 0.86 0.60 0.61 1.03 1.50 1.19 0.78
Non-operating
Revenue (loss) 0.03 0.07 0.03 (0.50) 0.03 0.55 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.32
Net Revenue (lose)
before interest (0.32) 0.37 0.03 0.36 0.63 1.16 1.06 1.66 1.22 1.10
Interest Charges 0.01 0.006 0.10 0.02 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.37
Net Revenue (loss) (0.33) 0.37 (0.07) o.34 0.28 0.81 0.74 1.37 0.92 0.73
Operating Ratio 105 9) 100 90 92 94 d8 89 87 95
Times Interest Earned -32.0 b.2 (-3-3) 18.0 1.8 3.3 3.3 5.7 4.1 2.9 X
Debt Coverage Ratio 13.0 50.9 3.d 17.4 2.2 5.o 2.9 7.1 3.3 4. 
Table 8
KOREA
SECOND RAILROAD PROJECT
6ummary Balance Sheets as of December 31
W. millions
1965 196
ASS'hTS
Fixed Assets - Gross value 73,210 8305
- Accumulated depreciation 7 957 9____
Net Value *533 74,320
- Work in Progress 4,661 _5208
70,114 79,)2b
investments 100 100
Current Assets - Cas.i 417 176
- Inventories 2,682 3,910
- Deposits 573 641
- Prepayments 664 967
- eeceivables 910 1,136
5,246 7,032
Deferred Assets 2,688 2,539
Total Assets 78,148 89,199
LIABILITIES
Equity - Fixed Capital 64,990 64,990.
- Capital Surplus 2,292 3,104
- Earned 6urplus 3,159 3,683
70,441 71,777
Allowance for modernization - j6
Long-Tern, Debt - Foreign Loans 5,161 10,002
- Korean Reconstruction Bank - 1,71
5,161 Ti,873
Current Liabilities - Accounts Payable 1,659 ),'Y72
- Miscellaneous 887 1 193
2,77 -4,960
Total Liabilities 78,148 89,199
RATIO0
Debt/Equity 7/93 14/66
Current Assets to Current Liabilities 2.1/1 1.4/1
Current Assets, less inventories, to Current
Liabilities 1/1 O.c/l
Table 9
KOREA
SECOND RAILROAD PROJECT
Composition of Debt as of December 31, 1966
Total Repayment
Year Amount Period Rate of Outstanding
Class of Loan Contracted (Won Million) (Years) Interest % (Won Million)
1. I.D.A. Relending (25-K0) 1962 3,759 25 3.75 ,31
2. U.S. AID I 1962 1,735 21 5-75 1,564
3. U.S. AID II 19b5 2,bl4 21 3.7> 2,14>
4. U.K. (CTC) 1905 3b2 15 Current
5. U.S. AID III 1966 5,078 16 5.75
6. JAPAN (OECF) I 1966 3,276 20 5.75 2,942
7. JAPAN (OECF) II 1966 1,918 20 5.75
b. KOREAN RECONSTRUCTION
BANK 1966 3,571 25 6.0 1,671
22,333 11,73
KOREA
SECOND RAIIJ4DAD PRQJECT
Foreign Exchange: UJS$ thousand equivalent
Development Program - 1967-1971 Local currency: Won million
Total costs: Won million
P r o je c t
1967 1968 1969 Project Totals 1970 1971 Program Totals
Items Total Total
Cost Cost
$ Won $ Won $ Won $ Won Won $ Won $ Won $ Won Won
Construction of rew lines
1. Gyeong Jeon 786 1,216 262 609 263 1,048 2,088 2,368 1,048 2,088 2,368
2. Jeong Seon 368 600 361 271 200 871 929 1,160 194 871 1,123 1,354
3. I&n Gyeong 103 200 220 100 256 300 579 659 300 579 659
4. Bi In 275 152 275 250 550 402 548 255 550 657 803
5. Jang Hang 500 110 40o 60 900 170 405 400 60 400 60 1,700 290 741
Sub-totals 786 1,687 1,837 1,452 1,046 1,029 3,669 4,168 5,140 400 509 400 60 4,469 4,737 5,925
Increase in station & line capacity
1. Seoul area 250 700 250 700 250 700 750 2,100 2,299 201 588 150 588 1,101 3,276 3,583
2. Marshalling yards V 350 280 350 280 350 280 1,050 84o 1,118 300 280 224 280 1,574 1,400 1,600
3. Loadirg and offloading facilities 40 53 40 79 40 74 120 206 238 4o 80 40 75 200 361 414
4. Building improvemnts & enlargemnts 66 112 66 244 244 222 214 680 680
5. Signalling & track extensions 474 437 347 1,258 1,258 214 350 220 450 434 2,058 2,174
Sub-totals 640 1,573 640 1,608 640 1,467 1,920 4,648 5,157 755 1,520 634 1,607 3,309 7,775 8,651
Way & structure renewals & improveints
1. Track (bed, ties, rails) 606 1,585 604 1,583 604 3,168 1,814 2,654 1,583 6 o4 1,583 604 6,334 3,022 4,700
2. Bridges 148 74 148 74 148 74 444 222 340 148 74 152 77 744 373 570
3. Equipment 150 10 150 10 300 20 100 158 10 152 20 610 50 210
Sub-totals 148 680 1,883 688 1,881 688 3,912 2,056 3,094 1,889 688 1,887 701 7,688 3,445 5,1 40
Motive Power & rolling stock
1. Locomotives 1,400 48 1,400 48 419 3,54o 70 5,040 74 9,980 192 2,836
2. Passanger cars 691 710 803 883 1,730 906 3,224 2,499 3,353 2,200 932 2,500 952 7,924 4,383 6,483
3. Freight cars 1,025 2,000 10,720 3,400 3,275 3,400 15,020 8,800 12,780 1,350 2,400 1,125 2,400 17,495 13,600 18,236
Sub-totals 1,716 2,710 11,523 4,283 6,405 k,354 19,644 11,347 16,552 7,090 3,402 8,665 3,426 35,399 18,175 27,555
Rolling stock equipment & construction
1. Spare parts 650 26 650 26 650 26 1,950 78 595 650 26 650 26 3,250 130 991
2. Sheds, workshops, etc 310 200 2,012 200 2,177 200 4,499 600 1,792 828 200 400 200 5,727 1,000 2,518
Sub-totals 960 226 2,662 226 2,827 226 6,449 678 2,387 1,478 226 1,050 226 8,977 1,130 3,509
Miscellaneous
1. Communications 49 68 75 68 75 185 205 75 67 28 150 280 320
2. Electric pownr & lightirg 30 42 50 120 120 70 88 278 278
3. Office mechanization 65 1 25 1 279 1 369 3 101 369 3 101 
4. Consultant services 150 16 250 16 250 16 650 48 220 250 16 230 16 1,130 80 380
Sub-totals 215 96 275 125 604 135 1,094 356 646 325 153 230 132 1,649 641 1,079
Total 4,465 6,972 18,820 8,382 13,403 7,899 36,688 23,253 32,976 11,937 6,498 12,866 6,152 61,491 35,903 52,199
Contingencies (10X) 447 897 1,882 738 1,340 690 3,669 2,325 3,297 1,194 650 1,286 615 6,149 3,590 5,220
GRAND TOTAL 4,912 7,869 20,702 9,120 14,743 8,589 40,357 25,578 36,273 13,131 7,148 14,152 6,767 67,640 39,493 57,419
1/ Includes doubling of 7 km of line between Bong Yang and Je Cheon mrshallirg yard.
KOREA
SECOND RAILROAD PRDJECT
New Line Construction 1967 - 1971
PROGRAM Financial Units: US$ = Thousands
Won = Millions
Lengtb Estimated Cost to cnD1etip Date
Name of Line Terminal Stations of Line Foreign Local Total Work Notes (including brief justification by KNR).
(km) (US$) (Won) (Won) Began
Gyeong Jeon Jin Ju - Sun Cheon 80 1,048 2,090 2,368 Apr.'64 Will shorten connections of western areas with
main port of Pu San.
Jeong Seon Jeong Seon - Gu Jeol Ri 24 871 1,113 1,344 Jan.1966 0.6 million tons a year of coal.
Mun Gyeong Bul Jeong - Mun Gyeong 12 300 579 659 May 1966 1.3 million tons a year of coal.
Bi In Seo Cheon - Bi In 22 550 707 853 Apr.'66 New industrial area at Bi In
Jang Hang Jang Hang - Gun San 16 2,100 343 900 Mar.'67 Direct link Bi In with south. Shortens trans-
port coal from Ong Ma to Gun San by 225 km.
Cost of bridge over river being shared with
Government.
154 h,869 4,832 6,124
NON-PROGRAM
Kwang Ju Kwang Ju - Dam Yang- 28 July '65 Agricultural products and passengers.
Gim Sam Gim Cheon - Jin Ju 159 Nov.'66 To accelerate development.
Chung Nam Non San - Seao Cheon 24 Dec.'66 Earthworks remain from Japanese occupation.
Mineral, forests and strategic value.
Dong Hae Bug Bu Dae Gin - Gang Reung 100 Dec.'66 To accelerate development.
Seo Hae An Dae Ya/Gim Jae -
Hag Geo 146 Apr.'67 Development of industrial and marine resources.
Bug Pyeong Sam Wha - Mug Ho 13 Dec.'66 To accelerate development.
Industrial sidings 3 Apr.'67 To accelerate development.
473
KOREA
SECOND RAILROAD PRDJ)JCT
Forecast Inco-ne Accounts 1967 - 1971
(Won Million)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
OPERAI'ING REVENUE
Passenger revenue 11,q99 14,629 16,595 17,636 18,760
Freight revenue 8,o25 10,780 11,575 12,LL1 13,h10
Other operating revenue 1,310 1,686 1,81T 1,958 2,122
Total operatirg revenue 20,434 27,095 29,984 32,035 34,292
OPERATIN EXPENSES
Operating expenses before depreciation ]l,b06 15,839 17,258 18,730 19,787
Depreciation provision 2,571 2,866 3,351 3,995 4,383
Moderni7ation provi.,on 977 1,089 1,273 1,518 1,666
Total operating exnenses 17,954 19,79 21,882 2h,243 25,836
Net operating revenue 2,h80 7,301 8,102 7,792 8,L56
Non-operatirg revenue (net) (61) 393 419 448 [479
Net revenue before interest 2,L19 7,69h 8,521 8,2h0 8,935
Interest charges 770 1,h62 1,797 1,893 1,923
Net revenue 1,649 62232 6,724 6,3h7 7,012
RATIOS:
Operating ratio 88 73 73 76 75 )
Tie s interest earned 3.1 5.3 L.7 . 4- 
Debt coverage 5 5 5.2 h.6 L. 4.3
Return on average net fixesi assets in use (%)- 1.6 4.8 5.0 5.0 5.1
N.+e :o :'Ine value of net fixed a sets in use is based unon prelirinary figures of a revaluation carried cut by K.N.R.
as of December -1), L966 which is tc be reviewed in an independent audit that nay result in change3.
KOREA TABI4 13
SECOND RAIROAD PROJECT
FORICAST CASH FLOW STATEKENT 1967-1971 Total
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1967-71
1. Investment Program: Local Funds 7,869 9,120 8,589 7,148 6,767 39,493
Foreign Exchange 1,302 5,486 3,907 3,480 3,750 17,925
Total cost of - - -
Program 9,171 1b,606 12,496 10,628 10,517 57,418
2. Ongoing Works 6,239 - - 6,239
O15,410 14,606 12,496 10,62d 10,517 63,657
TOTAL INVESTMET COST
3. Debt Service: Interest on Loans 770 1,462 1,797 1,893 1,923 7,845
Repayment of Loans 451 991 1 398 1 643 1 836 6 319
Total Debt Service r -2,453 3,195 3,536 3,759 14,16
4. Working Capital Increase (Decrease) (617) (22) 1,808 2,212 3,685 7,066
TOTAL FUNDS REQUIRED 16,014 17,037 1 9 17,  8 4,887
FUNDS AVAILABLE
1. Net Income Before Interest 2,419 7,694 8,521 8,240 8,935 35,809
2. Depreciation and Modernization 3,548 3,955 4,624 5,513 6,049 23,689
3. Sale of Assets 802 1§180 1,690 1,087 1,087 5,846
Sub-Total 6,769 12,829 14,835 14,840 16,071 65,3h4
4. Loans:
i) Existing Foreign Loans:
AiD 11 (USA) 445 445
AID III (USA) 5,078 5,078
CTC (U.K.) 382 382
O.E.C.F. I (Japan) 334 334
O.E.C.F. II (Japan) 1,262 656 1,918
ii) Proposed Foreign Loans:
O.E.C.F. (Japan - 2,233 1,742 1,399 1,520 6,894
I.D.A. Credit 40 2,597 278 - - 2,915
Other - - 1 887 2 081 2 230 6 198
Total Foreign Loans 'XT W t 7 8 Z4 2164
iii) Local Loans:
Korean Reconstruction Bank 1,700 1,700
TOTAL BORROWING 9,21 T 9 TW 3,7907 25,8
TOTAL FUNDS AVAILABLE 16 315 18 ,742 18320 19,821 91,208
CASH AT BEGINNING OF YEAR 176 172 1,450 2,693 4,637 176
CASH AT END OF YEAR 172 1,450 2,693 4,63? 6,496 6,496
KOREA
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Pro-forms Balance Sheets as of December 31, 1967-1971
(Won Billion)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
(actual)l/
ASSETS
Fixed Assets:
Land, buildings, machinery and equipment 166.30 181.06 194.63 205.59 215.28 224.86
Less depreciation allowance 17.48 20.05 22.92 26.27 30.27 34.65
Net fixed assets 148.82 161.01 171.71 179.32 185.01 190.21
Current Assets:
Cash .18 .17 1.45 2.69 h.64 6.50
Inventories 3.91 4.73 5.23 5.75 6.39 6.86
Other current assets 2.94 2.21 4.96 5.23 5.50 6.o4
Total current assets 7.03 7.11 11.64 13.67 16.53 19.40
Investments .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10
Deferred assets 2.54 2.39 2.24 2.09 1.94 1.79
TOTAL ASSETS 158.49 170.61 185.69 195.18 203.58 211.50
LIABILITIES
Equity
Fixed capital 64.99 64.99 64.99 64.99 64.99 64.99
Capital surplus 72.39 72.39 72.39 72.39 72.39 72.39
Earned surplus 3.68 5.33 11.56 18.28 24.63 31.64
Total equity 141.06 142.71 148.94 155.66 162.01 169.02
Allowance for modernization .58 1.56 2.65 3.92 5.44 7.11
Debt:
Foreign loans 10.00 17.09 21.59 24.09 25.93 27.85
Local borrowing 1.87 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.57
Total debt 11.87 20.66 25.16 27.66 29.50 31.42
Current liabilities 4.98 5.68 8.94 7.94 6.63 3.95 i
TOTAL LIABILITIES 158.49 170.61 185.69 195.18 203.58 211.50
RATIOS:
Current assets to current liabilities 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.7 2.5 4.9
Current assets less inventories to current liabilities o.6 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.5 3.2
Debt to equity 8/92 13/87 15/85 15/85 15/85 16/84
Note 1/: Including tentative results of revaluation of fixed assets, before auditing.
KOREA
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Traffic Forecasts For Principal Commodities 1967-1971
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Tons Ton-km Tons Ton-km Tons Ton-hn Tons Ton-km Tons Ton-km
Grain 1,000 285 1,050 296 1,140 322 1,220 344 1,320 372
Fertilizer 1,000 250 2,000 494 2,200 535 2,410 576 2,410 576
Cement 2,000 545 2,520 683 3,570 967 4,430 1,173 4,320 1,228
Coal 10,500 2,200 12,000 2,450 12,570 2,527 12,970 2,555 13,460 2,596
Oil 900 298 1,600 670 2,040 677 2,040 677 2,040 677
Others (including
imports) 7,640 1,865 8,620 1,900 9,440 2,250 10,670 2,500 13,060 2,500
Sub-total 23,040 5,443 27,990 6,493 30,960 7,278 33,740 7,825 36,810 8,251
KNR Freight 2,070 265 1,500 270 1,690 250 1,960 290 2,090 310
Military Freight 2,100 400 2,100 400 2,100 400 2,100 400 2,100 400
Total 27_210 6,12d 31t290 7,163 34,950 7 958 37,b00 8 515 41 000 8,961
Note: Tons in thousands
Ton-km in millions
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EMPLOYMENT OF CONSULTANTS BY KNR
The list below describes those areas where consulting services
are required during the Program period, 1967-71.
Statistics * All work is at present performed manually. The output is
copious but uncoordinated and contains discrepancies. There is need for
a study by consultants to examine and advise a) on the use of machines
to process information; b) on the coordination of the production and
presentation of statistics; and c) on the relation of statistics to
individual traffic costs.
Traffic Costing * The tariffs need revision. The consultants should
determine the current cost of individual freight and passenger traffics
and assess future costs in the light of traffic forecasts, investment plans
and other factors likely to affect operating and other costs, and establish
from the resultant data a structure and level of tariffs. The consultants
should also instruct the staff of KNR in the principles, processes and
techniques of traffic costing and establish a system which the staff can
maintain on a continuous basis for the future adjustment of rates and fares
to reflect changes in expenditure levels and patterns of cost.
Coal Traffic **- Coal traffic has increased from 5 to 10 million tons in
the last five years and is expected to rise to nearly 14 million tor,s by
1971. Some 30 to 40% of all coal moved by rail is consumed in the Seoul
metropolitan area. The handling of this quickly increasing traffic causes
many loading, offloading, storage and distribution problems. Among other
problems mechanized coal hopper cars are improperly utilized. At the request
of the Association, KMN had the rail aspects of the problem exaimined by
consultants, SOFRERAIL. Recent Government and coal industry changes in
plans have vitiated SOFRERAIL's proposals. There is need for a new and
comprehensive study by consultants on behalf of all interests concerned -
the Government, the coal industry, the city of Seoul and KUR - to ensure
that the most economic and practical solutions are reached.
Rolling Stock The maintenance of existing rolling stock should be improved.
Also the construction and rebuilding of rolling stock should be to better
designs and specifications than are now available. So that KNR may have
the advantage of most recent technical experience and advances, consultants
should be appointed to advise a) on the maintenance and repair of existing
rolling stock, with particular reference to repair facilities and repair
programs, including the repair and/or replacement of existing axle boxes, and
b) on the design of new and/or modified rolling stock to obtain higher net
loads, lowxer tare weights and low annual maintenance costs.
* Consultant studies currently under consideration.
** Cost to be shared with other parties concerned.
ANNEX
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Marshalling Yards KNR plan large investments in marshalling yards in the
Seoul area and also at Bon Yang, Je Cheon, Yeon Ju and Jeom Chou, in the
next five years. Ul San yard may also require to be relocated and enLarged
in this period. In addition, extensions and enlargements are considered
necessary at various smaller railroad centers. It is considered that the
problem of the location, size and type of marshalling yards in relation to
traffic flows and operating requirements should be studied by consultants.
The appointment of consultants for coal traffic in the Seoul area
should be a condition of effectiveness of the proposed credit or of disburse-
ment from the credit account; the appointment of other consultants should
be made in accordance with a schedule to be agreed during negotiations.
Uneconomic lines The transportation survey identified seven existing lines
which are not yielding revenues sufficient to cover costs. There is need
for consultants to review the economics of these lines in detail and advise
on appropriate action.
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